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[30 ELR 11122] 
As we wrote last year, the U.S. Supreme Court has shown considerable interest during the past 
decade in reconsidering many constitutional doctrines regarding federalism and congressional 
power.1 In a series of important decisions, always decided with the same five justices in the 
majority,2 the Court has begun to redefine the federal-state relationship and the scope of federal 
authority.3 The past term generally continued that trend, with one important commerce power 
decision,4 one significant Eleventh Amendment/Fourteenth Amendment § 5 decision,5 and a 
number of decisions that involve or affect federalism and the scope of federal power, although the 
Court sometimes relied on statutory interpretation to avoid serious constitutional issues.6 Part I of 
this Article describes the most recent decisions. 
This continuing redefinition of the scope of federal power in relation to that of the states is 
potentially significant for the implementation and enforcement of federal environmental laws, the 
main focus of this Article. The effectiveness of federal environmental regulation depends not only, 
however, on the degree to which the federal government is authorized to control activities with 
potential adverse environmental effects, but also on the manner in which that authority is allocated 
among the three branches of the federal government. The Court did not immerse itself in the last 
two years in this second aspect of the two main branches of structural constitutional inquiry to the 
same degree that it tackled high-profile federalism issues. A couple of decisions handed down 
during the Court's last term concerning standing to sue and a case the Court has agreed to hear 
during the October Term 2000 may yet bring these separation-of-powers questions to the fore, 
however. To round out the analysis of the status of federal power to affect matters environmental, 
therefore, this Article seeks as a secondary matter to consider briefly the potential impact of the 
Court's separation-of-powers jurisprudence on federal environmental law. 
Part I of the Article briefly summarizes several potentially important cases to be decided during the 
October Term 2000 that involve serious questions of constitutional power. Two of the cases raise 
federalism issues. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (SWANNC),7 the Court will consider whether the federal government has the 
constitutional authority under the U.S. Commerce Clause to regulate isolated intrastate wetlands. 
The second case is not itself an environmental case, although its resolution may affect the manner 
in which the federal environmental laws may be enforced. In that case, the Court will once again 
examine the scope of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, this time in the 
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context of determining whether Congress validly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity under the Americans With Disabilities Act.8 The third pending case represents perhaps 
the most important separation-of-powers case involving federal administrative law that the Court 
has agreed to hear in decades. In U.S. Environmental Protection Agency v. Browner,9 a case 
involving U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations implementing the Clean Air 
Act (CAA), the Court will consider whether EPA acted pursuant to an unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative authority. 
Part II of this Article analyzes the Court's recent federalism decisions and congressional power 
decisions. Part II begins by addressing the implications of the Court's recent commerce power 
decisions for federal environmental laws, as well as reviewing recent lower court decisions in 
which regulated entities have challenged the validity of federal environmental regulation as beyond 
the scope of the commerce power. It next considers briefly the manner in which [30 ELR 11123] 
the lower courts have reacted to the trilogy of Eleventh Amendment cases decided by the Court 
during the October Term 1999, which we wrote about last year.10 Because the Court avoided 
addressing an unresolved Eleventh Amendment issue this year in a case in which the Court itself 
raised an important standing question, we take the opportunity in this part of the Article to consider 
the opinion and another recent standing decision that affects the degree to which the federal courts 
have the authority to assist in the implementation of federal environmental legislation. 
Part II then considers some new developments in the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence 
that may have some bearing on the federal environmental laws. Part II next addresses a potential 
"disconnect" in the Court's federalism jurisprudence: at the same time the Court has reinvigorated 
the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, and has interpreted Congress' commerce power more 
restrictively than it previously had, the Court has pursued a jurisprudence of federal preemption 
that has permitted extensive preemption of state laws and regulations, including in the 
environmental context.11 
The federal-state relationship in the implementation of environmental legislation is a multifaceted 
one. Not all of its components have received as much attention as the Court's commerce power or 
Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendment decisions. Part II concludes with a discussion of 
some lower court cases that do not involve constitutional questions but that nevertheless affect the 
federalism equation in environmental law in potentially significant ways. To date, these statutory 
interpretation cases have not generally been connected with the Court's federalism jurisprudence 
that is the principal focus of this Article. The cases we explore briefly here relate to the degree to 
which the states may enforce their own environmental laws against the federal government and the 
extent to which state enforcement of environmental regulation may preclude the federal 
government from pursuing its own enforcement initiatives. 
I. Recent Federalism and Congressional Power Cases 
During the October Term 1998, the Court focused its efforts in the federalism arena on exploring 
the parameters of the states' constitutionally protected immunity from suit. In Alden v. Maine,12 the 
Court held that Congress lacks the power to subject unconsenting states to suits in state court for 
alleged violations of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. In two related cases involving alleged 
violations by the state of Florida of the federal patent and trademark laws, the Court held that 
Congress lacks the authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate states' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court for alleged trademark and patent transgressions.13 
Although two of these cases involved the interplay of the Eleventh Amendment and § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, all three cases revolved around the scope of the constitutional immunity 
afforded to the states to avoid suits by private individuals. 
The cases handed down by the Court during its October Term 1999—and the cases the Court has 
agreed to hear during its October Term 2000—lack such a legal focal point. Instead, these cases 
invoke a series of constitutional provisions that bear on the division of governmental powers 
between the federal and state governments. The affected provisions include the Commerce 
Clause,14 the Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Supremacy Clause.15 For good 
measure, the Court has agreed to hear a case in which it may decide whether Congress' power to 
protect the environment pursuant to the Commerce Clause may in turn be delegated to a federal 
administrative agency. 
A. The October Term 1999 
1. The Commerce Power 
a. United States v. Morrison 
The most important commerce power decision of the past term was United States v. Morrison.16 In 
a 5-4 decision, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 13981—a provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA) that created a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence—
exceeded Congress' commerce power.17 
Applying the Court's decision in United States v. Lopez,18 the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court 
concluded that gender-motivated violence had an insufficient effect on interstate commerce to 
justify the statutory provision as an exercise of the commerce power. The Court emphasized that 
Lopez categorized Congress' commerce power as having three aspects—the authority to regulate 
(1) the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and (3) 
those activities that cumulatively have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.19 When a case 
falls into the third category (substantial effects), as this case did, the Court observed that Lopez 
directs the Court to look at several factors, such as (1) the nature of the activity at issue, (2) the 
presence or absence of a jurisdictional, interstate commerce element in the statute, and (3) any 
findings made by Congress regarding the effects on interstate commerce.20 
Examining those factors in this case, the Court concluded that "the proper resolution of the present 
cases is clear."21 First, the Court declared that gender-motivated violence is [30 ELR 11124] "not, 
in any sense of the phrase, economic activity."22 Nor does the VAWA's civil remedy provision have 
a jurisdictional element limiting such actions to cases involving proof of interstate activity.23 The 
Court acknowledged that Congress did make extensive findings regarding the effects of gender-
motivated violence on interstate commerce, but the Court concluded that those findings were 
unpersuasive and not well-reasoned.24 The Court opined that Congress' reasoning that the 
cumulative effect of gender-motivated crimes is a decrease in employment, travel, production, and 
so forth, all of which affects interstate commerce, was an invitation to permit Congress to regulate 
virtually any crimes or activity, including traditional state prerogatives such as marriage, divorce, 
and childrearing.25 According to the Court, such an expansion of congressional power would, in 
turn, obliterate any distinction between national and local authority.26 
b. Reno v. Condon 
The second case that raised commerce power issues was Reno v. Condon,27 in which the state of 
South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act 
(DPPA) of 1994.28 Among other things, that statute restricted the states' ability to disclose driver's 
license information without a driver's consent. The Court considered and rejected two challenges to 
the statute: (1) that it exceeded Congress' commerce power, and (2) that the law violated the Tenth 
Amendment.29 
The Court quickly dispensed with South Carolina's commerce power challenge, concluding that 
driver's license information is "an article of commerce" and that, at least in this context, "its sale or 
release into the interstate stream of business is sufficient to support congressional regulation."30 
After reaching this conclusion, the Court then observed that "we need not address the 
Government's alternative argument that the States' individual, intrastate activities in gathering, 
maintaining, and distributing drivers' personal information has a sufficiently substantial impact on 
interstate commerce to create a constitutional base for federal legislation."31 
c. Jones v. United States 
Finally, in Jones v. United States,32 the Court held that the federal arson statute33 does not apply to 
arson of a private, owner-occupied residence. Relying on the statute's language, which makes it a 
federal crime to commit arson upon "any . . . property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in 
any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce," the Court held that the key word was 
"used."34 That word, according to the Court, indicates that Congress did not intend the statute to 
invoke the full scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.35 Rather, Congress 
intended to criminalize only those arsons of buildings used in interstate commerce. 
Applying that interpretation of the statute to this case, the Court concluded that the private 
residence at issue was not "used" in interstate commerce. The Court rejected the government's 
claims that the statute applied because the mortgage on the home was held by an out-of-state entity, 
the home was insured by an out-of-state entity, and the home received natural gas from out-of-state 
sources.36 Finally, the Court observed that the government's broader reading of the statute would 
raise serious constitutional questions, in light of Lopez, and that the doctrine of constitutional doubt 
therefore favored the Court's adoption of the narrower construction.37 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred but observed that the Court should be 
particularly reluctant to interpret federal criminal statutes broadly when the federal interest in the 
case is marginal.38 Justice Thomas also concurred separately, with Justice Scalia, to emphasize that 
they were not expressing any opinion on the question whether the federal statute, even as narrowly 
construed by the majority, "is constitutional in its application to all buildings used for commercial 
activities."39 
2. Tenth Amendment 
The only true Tenth Amendment decision the past term was Reno.40 In that case, as indicated 
above, South Carolina challenged the constitutionality of the federal DPPA.41 That law generally 
prohibits states and others from disclosing driver's license information without the driver's consent, 
and imposes several penalties for noncompliance. South Carolina argued that the DPPA effectively 
"commandeered" state employees in violation of the Tenth Amendment, by requiring those 
employees to learn the federal law's provisions and spend considerable time implementing it.42 
The Court agreed that the DPPA "will require time and effort on the part of state employees,"43 but 
quickly rejected the argument that the federal law violated the Tenth Amendment principles set 
forth in New York v. United States44 and Printz v. United States.45 The Court found those two cases 
inapplicable, and instead relied upon its earlier decision in South Carolina v. Baker,46 which upheld 
a federal statute that prohibited states from issuing unregistered bonds. The [30 ELR 11125] Court 
drew a distinction between federal statutes that seek to control the manner in which the states 
regulate private parties (the situations in New York and Printz) and federal laws that regulate the 
states in their own activities.47 It is only the former that pose the kind of "commandeering" threat to 
state sovereignty that prompted invalidation of the laws in New York and Printz. 
The Court then concluded that "the DPPA does not require the states in their sovereign capacity to 
regulate their own citizens. The DPPA regulates the states as the owners of databases."48 Lastly, the 
Court addressed South Carolina's argument that Congress cannot regulate the states exclusively, 
but rather may regulate them only by means of "generally applicable" laws that apply to 
individuals as well as the states.49 The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the issue because it 
concluded that the DPPA "is generally applicable. The DPPA regulates the universe of entities that 
participate as suppliers to the market for motor vehicle information . . . ."50 
3. Eleventh Amendment 
The Court decided two cases the past term that dealt at least tangentially with the Eleventh 
Amendment. In one case, the Court avoided directly deciding the Eleventh Amendment issue by 
interpreting a federal statute to exclude states from its coverage.51 In the other, the Court's focus 
was on Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the states' immunity 
from suit in federal court.52 
In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens,53 the Court was asked to 
decide whether the word "person" includes the states, when used in the federal False Claims Act 
(FCA) provision that permits private parties to bring qui tam actions against "any person" who 
knowingly defrauds the government. The second question presented was whether the Eleventh 
Amendment barred such actions in federal court when the United States does not formally 
intervene in the case. Sua sponte, and shortly before the oral argument of the case, the Court 
ordered the parties to address a third question: whether qui tam plaintiffs have Article III standing 
to bring such suits on behalf of the United States. 
The Court decided that qui tam plaintiffs do have Article III standing. Although the harm to the 
United States as a sovereign and the government's loss due to fraud do not give such plaintiffs 
standing,54 the Court concluded that qui tam cases are analogous to those in which the Court has 
found standing for the assignee of a legal claim.55 Effectively, held the Court, the FCA results in a 
partial assignment (in the form of a bounty to successful qui tam plaintiffs) of the government's 
claim against the defrauder.56 The Court found further support for that conclusion in the long 
tradition of qui tam actions in both England and the American Colonies.57 The Court's holding on 
standing is potentially important for the enforcement of the federal environmental laws for reasons 
discussed below.58 
The Court, however, avoided the Eleventh Amendment issue altogether. Focusing on the FCA's 
use of the word "person" to describe the category of defendants in qui tam actions, the Court 
started with its "long-standing interpretive presumption that 'person' does not include the 
sovereign."59 The Court opined that the statute's legislative history did not support applying the 
provision at issue to the States, nor do other related statutes and statutory provisions.60 With respect 
to the Eleventh Amendment, the Court added at the end of its opinion the following observation: 
"We of course express no view on the question whether an action in federal court by a qui tam 
relator against a State would run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment, but we note that there is 'a 
serious doubt' on that score."61 
The second pseudo-Eleventh Amendment case of the term was Kimel v. Florida Board of 
Regents,62 discussed fully in the next section. In Kimel, the Court held that Congress lacked the 
constitutional authority—under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—to abrogate the states' Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from claims of age discrimination under the federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967.63 
4. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
a. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents 
In Kimel,64 the Court addressed the scope of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to create a federal cause of action and money damages remedy for age discrimination 
in employment matters. The Court first concluded that in enacting the ADEA, Congress intended 
to subject the states to suits by individuals in federal court for violations of the Act.65 The Court 
further concluded, however, that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to subject the states 
to such suits.66 
Emphasizing that recent decisions have made clear that Congress lacks the constitutional authority 
to abrogate the states' immunity pursuant to Congress' Article I powers, the Court considered 
whether Congress nevertheless could accomplish the same result under the authority vested in it by 
[30 ELR 11126] § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.67 Articulating and applying the City of Boerne 
v. Flores68 test—that Fourteenth Amendment, § 5 legisiation must be "congruent" and 
"proportional" to the constitutional violations it is addressing, the Court concluded that the ADEA 
failed that test. 
The Court began by emphasizing that age classifications are not considered "suspect" for equal 
protection purposes and that the Court has only applied rational basis review to constitutional age 
discrimination claims, generally in rejecting such claims.69 Thus, the Court found the ADEA's 
provisions to "prohibit[] substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would 
likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard."70 
Nonetheless, the Court recognized that § 5 legislation can be "prophylactic" in nature, i.e., 
designed to prevent and deter serious constitutional violations from occurring.71 The Court was 
unpersuaded that the ADEA's provisions fell into that category, concluding instead that Congress 
had no real evidence before it when enacting the ADEA that the states were engaging in serious or 
systematic age discrimination against their employees.72 
b. United States v. Morrison 
In Morrison,73 whose commerce power analysis is discussed above, the Court struck down the civil 
remedy provision of the federal VAWA.74 The Court acknowledged that Congress had developed a 
voluminous record showing that "there is pervasive bias in various state justice systems against 
victims of gender-motivated violence,"75 which Congress relied upon as justifying the civil remedy 
provision of the VAWA. 
The Court observed, however, that Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
limited in several respects. "Foremost among these limitations is the time-honored principle that 
the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action."76 The Court found that 
the VAWA provision at issue—which created a civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated 
violence against their private attackers—exceeded congressional authority in that respect: the 
provision "is directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed 
criminal acts motivated by gender bias."77 Moreover, with reference to the City of Boerne 
"congruence" and "proportionality" test, the Court concluded that the statute was too sweeping in 
its reach to be justified under § 5, because "it applies uniformly throughout the Nation,"78 rather 
than to only those states where discrimination against the victims of gender-motivated violence has 
been demonstrated. 
5. The Supremacy Clause 
An area of "federalism" jurisprudence that has often been overlooked is federal preemption of state 
common law and state statutory law. In contrast to its Commerce Clause and Fourteenth 
Amendment decisions, the Court this past term decided every important preemption case (one 
involving state environmental regulations) in favor of the federal government, reading expansively 
the federal power to preempt state law. As we discuss later in this Article, and as other 
commentators have begun to discuss,79 one might legitimately question whether the preemption 
cases are consistent with the Court's other federalism jurisprudence. For that reason, we describe 
the cases very briefly. 
In response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of Alaska in 1989, the state of Washington 
promulgated numerous regulations addressing the design, equipment, reporting, and operation 
requirements of oil tankers. In United States v. Locke,80 the Court held that federal statutes81 
preempted many of those state regulations. The Court began by emphasizing the federal 
government's strong and long-standing interest in maritime matters.82 According to the Court, the 
long-standing federal interest in maritime matters undermined any claim that the Court should 
employ a "presumption against preemption" in this case. Rather, "an 'assumption' of nonpre-
emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of 
significant federal presence."83 
The Court then reviewed the various federal statutes at issue and concluded that federal law 
occupied the "field" with respect to regulations involving the design, construction, maintenance, 
manning, and other operational aspects of oil tankers.84 Thus, the states have no authority to 
regulate such matters, even in the absence of federal regulation (field preemption).85 The Court 
acknowledged that states have the authority to regulate with respect to the peculiarities of local [30 
ELR 11127] waters, but only so long as state regulations do not conflict with any federal law 
(conflict preemption).86 
Another important preemption case was Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.87 By a 5-4 vote, the 
Court held that a federal safety standard which gave car manufacturers the option of installing 
airbags in 1987 model-year cars88 preempts state common-law tort actions in which the plaintiff 
claims the manufacturer should have installed airbags. In reaching that conclusion, the majority 
addressed three questions. 
First, the Court held that the state-law tort claim was not expressly preempted by federal law,89 
because the relevant statute—the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 196690—had an 
express savings clause which provided that compliance with federal standards "does not exempt 
any person from any liability under common law."91 But second, and perhaps most importantly, the 
Court held that the law's savings clause did not foreclose the possibility of "implied" preemption 
where application of state tort law would actually "conflict" with federal standards.92 Thus, in spite 
of the express savings provision, the Court concluded that the defendant did not have to meet any 
"special burden" to establish federal preemption.93 Finally, the Court held that state-tort law 
conflicts with the federal standard, which was designed to give car manufacturers flexibility and 
incentives to develop and install a variety of passive restraint devices, not just airbags.94 
Perhaps most interesting is the dissenting opinion in Geier, written by Justice Stevens but joined by 
Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. The second paragraph of Justice Stevens' dissent begins as 
follows: 
"This is a case about federalism," that is, about respect for "the constitutional role of the States as 
sovereign entities." It raises important questions concerning the way in which the Federal 
Government may exercise its undoubted power to oust state courts of their traditional jurisdiction 
over common-law tort actions.95 
Importantly, the dissent argued that there is a presumption against preemption of state tort law by 
federal regulations, and that the party asserting that state law has been displaced bears a "special 
burden" in overcoming the presumption.96 
Three other cases merit brief mention. In Jones,97 decided the same day as Geier, Justice Stevens 
(joined by Justice Thomas) concurred in the result—that the federal statute at issue did not reach 
the arson of a private residence not used in interstate commerce—but wrote separately to 
emphasize federalism principles. Thus, Justice Stevens wrote that it "seems appropriate, however, 
to emphasize the kinship between our well-established presumption against federal pre-emption of 
state law, and our reluctance to 'believe Congress intended to authorize federal intervention in local 
law enforcement in a marginal case such as this.'"98 Thus, he reiterated his "firm belief that we 
should interpret narrowly federal criminal laws that overlap with state authority unless 
congressional intention to assert its jurisdiction is plain."99 
In Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin,100 the Court held that federal law preempts state tort 
law—that would otherwise apply to an accident between a car and a train at a railroad crossing—
when federal money was used to install whatever warning devices were present at the crossing. 
This holding resulted from the Court's reading of a rather confusing pair of regulations101 that the 
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970102 specifically authorized the Secretary of Transportation to 
promulgate. 
Finally, in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,103 the Court unanimously held that federal 
law preempts Massachusetts' "Burma" law. In June 1996, Massachusetts enacted a law restricting 
the authority of its agencies to purchase goods or services from companies doing business with 
Burma. Three months later, Congress enacted measures imposing mandatory and conditional 
sanctions on Burma. The issue in the case was whether the federal actions preempted the 
Massachusetts law. 
In concluding that federal law preempted the Massachusetts law, the Court relied on "conflict" 
preemption.104 The Court concluded that the Massachusetts law frustrated the purpose and effect of 
the federal measures in at least three ways: by interfering with the discretion Congress delegated to 
the president to control economic sanctions against Burma,105 by potentially expanding the limited 
sanctions Congress authorized,106 and by undermining the president's authority to speak for the 
United States among the world's nations to develop a Burma strategy.107 Interestingly, in resolving 
the case, the Court left "for another day a consideration in this context of a presumption against 
preemption," finding that the Massachusetts Burma law actually conflicted with federal law.108 
B. The October Term 2000 
1. The Commerce Power 
The Commerce Clause case the Court has agreed to hear this term deals with the issue of Congress' 
authority to regulate the development of isolated intrastate wetlands under the [30 ELR 11128] 
dredge and fill permit program of the Clean Water Act (CWA).109 The Seventh Circuit held in a 
1992 decision that EPA regulation of isolated wetlands (a 1-acre pond located 750 feet from a 
stream in the Chicago suburbs) was beyond the commerce power,110 but the court later vacated that 
decision and ruled that the statute covers waters whose connection to interstate commerce is 
potential and minimal and that EPA reasonably designated the use of wetlands by migratory birds 
as a sufficient connection to interstate commerce to support regulation.111 The Ninth Circuit 
subsequently ruled that, although regulation of isolated wetlands used as migratory bird habitat 
"tests the limits of Congress's commerce powers," such regulation is not unconstitutional.112 The 
Fourth Circuit, however, in a 1997 decision, invalidated as beyond the scope of the statute the 
portion of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' regulation that included the migratory bird rule.113 
The court supported its narrow reading of the statute by casting doubt on the constitutional validity 
of a broader interpretation. 
The Court has granted certiorari in SWANCC,114 a case in which a municipal corporation created by 
a group of 23 municipalities sought to convert about 180 acres of a 533-acre parcel (located in 
Cane and Cook counties and once used as a gravel mining operation) into a balefill for the disposal 
of nonhazardous solid waste.115 Gravel pits at the site over time had become transformed into more 
than 200 permanent and seasonal ponds ranging in size from less than one-tenth of an acre to 
several acres, and from several inches to several feet in depth. The surrounding early successional 
stage forest was vegetated by about 170 different species of plants and was home to a variety of 
small animals. More than 100 species of birds were observed there, including endangered, water-
dependent, and migratory species, such as great blue herons.116 The Corps determined that 17.6 
acres of the balefill area contained "navigable waters," as defined by the CWA, and therefore 
required the plaintiff to obtain a dredge and fill permit. The Corps' regulations defined 
jurisdictional waters to include wetlands whose "use, degradation or destruction could affect 
interstate or foreign commerce,"117 and the preamble to the regulations explained that those 
wetlands include wetlands which "are or could be used by migratory birds which cross state 
lines."118 
SWANCC, the owner of the proposed balefill site, claimed that the site was not subject to federal 
regulatory jurisdiction because the migratory birds found there have no relationship to interstate 
commerce in that they do not support any human commercial activity on the site itself.119 When the 
district court ruled to the contrary,120 SWANCC appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 
The first issue, according to the court, was whether Lopez dictates the conclusion that Congress' 
powers under the Commerce Clause are not broad enough to permit regulation of waters based on 
the presence of migratory birds.121 The court interpreted Lopez as confirming the principle that a 
single activity that itself has no discernible effect on interstate commerce may nevertheless be 
regulated if the aggregate effect of that class of activity has a substantial impact on interstate 
commerce. The issue, therefore, was whether the destruction of the natural habitat of migratory 
birds in the aggregate "substantially affects" interstate commerce.122 The court concluded that the 
aggregate effect is clear, citing evidence that Americans spend more than $ 1 billion a year hunting 
migratory birds, and that about 11% of the 3.1 million hunters cross state lines to do so. Another 17 
million people observe birds in states other than their residence, most of them traveling for just that 
purpose. The court responded to SWANCC's contention that such a result "excludes nothing"123 by 
noting that the Corps may not assert jurisdiction under the migratory bird rule unless it first makes 
a factual determination that a particular body of water provides a habitat for migratory birds, and 
that "habitat" means a place where a species naturally lives or grows, not just alights for a few 
minutes. The Corps made just such a showing here. 
SWANCC also charged that sustaining the validity of the migratory bird rule is inconsistent with 
"the principles of federalism that motivated the Court in Lopez, because it erodes the 'distinction 
between what is truly national and what is truly local.'"124 But the court rejected the notion that the 
protection of migratory bird habitat is a matter of purely local concern, citing the numerous 
international treaties that protect those birds as evidence to the contrary.125 SWANCC claimed that 
allowing a federal agency such as the Corps to [30 ELR 11129] override local zoning and land use 
planning decisions conflicts with notions of state sovereignty. The court disagreed, reasoning that 
because regulation of migratory birds falls within the scope of the commerce power, the 
Supremacy Clause supports the legitimacy of giving federal law precedence over local land use 
laws.126 
SWANCC argued next that, even if Congress could constitutionally have exercised authority over 
the balefill site based on the actual or potential presence of migratory bird habitat, it did not intend 
to do so. Citing a line of cases that support interpreting the CWA as reaching as many waters as the 
Commerce Clause allows,127 the court concluded that the interpretation of the statute adhered to by 
EPA and the Corps, i.e., that it encompassed activities covered by the migratory bird rule, was a 
reasonable one.128 The court distinguished the Fourth Circuit's decision in Wilson on the ground 
that the court there held that Congress did not intend to regulate situations in which use or 
destruction of the wetlands "could" affect interstate commerce. In this case, the unchallenged facts 
showed that the filling of the acres in question would have an immediate effect on migratory birds 
that actually used the area as a habitat.129 
SWANCC sought certiorari on both the constitutional and statutory issues addressed by the 
Seventh Circuit,130 and the parties have briefed both sets of issues.131 Accordingly, it is possible that 
the Court will conclude that the statute does not cover the proposed balefill site and therefore, like 
the Wilson court, avoid the necessity of confronting the constitutional question directly. 
2. The Nondelegation Doctrine 
The link between federalism and separation-of-powers issues may not be immediately apparent. To 
be sure, both sets of questions require definition of the allocation of governmental power under the 
structural provisions of the U.S. Constitution. The link may be even more direct, however. In a 
recent case challenging a regulation designed to protect endangered species as beyond the scope of 
the federal commerce power, a federal appellate court warned that "separation of powers principles 
mandate" that the courts leave decisions over the substantive merit of the scope and manner of 
environmental protection measures "to Congress and to agencies with congressionally sanctioned 
expertise and authority."132 
The link between federalism and separation-of-powers issues in environmental law is highlighted 
by the presence on the Court's October Term 2000 docket of two environmental cases, one of 
which, SWANCC, involves delineation of the scope of the Commerce Clause as it applies to 
environmental legislation, the other of which presents perhaps the most fundamental separation-of-
powers question involving the scope of administrative agency authority to face the Court in 
decades. Depending upon how the Court resolves that case, inquiries about the constitutional 
validity of the actions of EPA, the U.S. Department of the Interior, and other federal environmental 
agencies might proceed along a dual track in the future. First, the courts will inquire whether 
Congress is empowered by the Commerce Clause (or some other source of federal power, such as 
the treaty power or the Property Clause) to engage in a particular form of environmental regulation. 
Second, assuming the answer to that question is affirmative, the courts might have to investigate 
whether Congress has appropriately delegated that authority to an administrative agency like EPA. 
The nondelegation doctrine is based on the constitutional provision vesting all legislative powers in 
Congress.133 The doctrine makes it improper for Congress to delegate those powers to another 
institution.134 To avoid running afoul of that prohibition, Congress, when it delegates authority to 
an administrative agency, must provide the agency with an intelligible principle to guide the 
exercise of its discretion.135 The Court relied on the nondelegation doctrine to strike down key 
aspects of the initial wave of New Deal legislation.136 In the last 65 years, the Court has not relied 
on the doctrine to invalidate a single piece of federal legislation,137 although it (and the lower 
courts) has invoked the doctrine to support narrow interpretations of statutes delegating authority to 
federal agencies.138 
Given that historical backdrop, the result in the D.C. Circuit's 1999 decision in American Trucking 
Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,139 where the court struck down EPA's 1997 
revisions to the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for ozone and particulate matter 
based on the nondelegation doctrine, was surprising.140 The court agreed with the argument of the 
small business [30 ELR 11130] petitioners that EPA had "construed §§ 108 and 109 of the [CAA] 
so loosely as to render them unconstitutional delegations of legislative power."141 The problem, 
according to Judge Stephen Williams' opinion for a 2-1 majority, was the Agency's failure to 
articulate an "intelligible principle" to channel its application of the factors the Agency was 
supposed to consider in determining the level at which NAAQS would be "requisite to protect the 
public health"142 with an adequate margin of safety.143 Although the factors EPA selected to 
determine the manner in which it would set the standards were permissible, "what EPA lacks is any 
determinate criterion for drawing lines. It has failed to state intelligibly how much is too much."144 
EPA failed to provide any convincing explanation of why it chose not to set the standards at either 
a higher or lower level. 
The court's decision is surprising in part because the CAA is among the most detailed of the federal 
environmental statutes and would not seem a likely candidate for invalidation on the ground of lack 
of specificity. Indeed, as Judge Tatel pointed out in his dissenting opinion, EPA's authority to enact 
or revise NAAQS had been the subject of numerous previous decisions, none of which had even 
hinted at a potential nondelegation problem.145 Moreover, the relevant CAA provision was at least 
as specific as many the Court has upheld against nondelegation challenges in the past.146 The D.C. 
Circuit in American Trucking did not strike down the provision of the CAA authorizing EPA to 
establish NAAQS, however. Instead, the court remanded to EPA to "give the agency an 
opportunity to extract a determinate standard on its own."147 It is that very remedy that provides an 
additional peculiar aspect of the majority's decision to invalidate the challenged NAAQS on 
nondelegation grounds. As Judge Silberman noted in his dissent from the decision on rehearing, 
the purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is "to ensure that Congress makes the crucial policy 
choices that are carried into law."148 The majority's decision and accompanying remedy forces 
EPA, not Congress, to supply a narrowing construction of the statute. 
The Court granted certiorari and will hear the case during the October Term 2000. It may not reach 
the constitutional issue, however, because it granted not only EPA's petition challenging the D.C. 
Circuit's resolution of the nondelegation issue, but also industry's petition149 challenging the D.C. 
Circuit's affirmation of previous cases that established the proposition that the CAA bars EPA from 
considering cost when it promulgates a NAAQS.150 If the Court were to conclude that the statute 
requires EPA to consider cost, and that the 1997 NAAQS revisions are invalid due to the Agency's 
failure to do so, the Court presumably would be able to, and would choose to, avoid the 
constitutional question. Such a decision would itself have far-reaching implications for EPA's 
administration of the CAA, and perhaps for the interpretation of other federal environmental 
legislation that, on its face, does not mandate cost consideration or cost-benefit analysis. Those 
implications would pale by comparison, however, to a decision upholding the D.C. Circuit's 
decision that the NAAQS violate the nondelegation doctrine. Such a result would place in issue the 
constitutional validity of countless federal regulatory actions undertaken pursuant to a plethora of 
environmental and nonenvironmental statutes alike. Indeed, it might usher in an era that could 
properly be labeled the "new" separation-of-powers jurisprudence.151 
3. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
In University of Alabama at Birmingham Board of Trustees v. Garrett,152 a likely reprise of the 
Court's decision last term in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,153 the Court will consider whether 
Congress had the constitutional authority—pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—to 
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when Congress enacted the Americans With 
Disabilities Act (ADA).154 Like the ADEA,155 which was at issue in Kimel, the ADA does not deal 
with a classification (disability) that receives a heightened level of scrutiny under the Court's 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence.156 Thus, only irrational disability 
classifications are likely to [30 ELR 11131] amount to constitutional violations, and the ADA—
like the ADEA—will be difficult to justify as merely creating a remedial scheme for redressing 
constitutional violations. Instead, as with the ADEA, the United States likely will have to argue 
that the ADA is a prophylactic measure necessary to deter and preclude irrational discrimination by 
the states against the disabled. The critical questions then are likely to be whether the Court will 
accept that argument and whether, even if so, the Court will find the ADA's provisions to be both 
"proportional" and "congruent" to the disability discrimination problems Congress perceived.157 
C. Summary 
The federalism cases the Court decided during the October Term 1999 ranged broadly across the 
terrain of constitutional federalism. The most striking decision almost certainly was Morrison, in 
which the Court made it clear that the 1995 Lopez decision is something more than an isolated 
anomaly and that, contrary to pre-1995 appearances, questions involving the scope of the federal 
commerce power are far from settled, at least at the periphery of that power. The expected decision 
in the SWANCC case, discussed more fully below, may provide specific further insight into the 
degree to which these recently enunciated limits are likely to affect existing federal environmental 
legislation. The area in which the Court was most active last year was preemption, a sometimes 
neglected stepchild of the "new" federalism. As Part II of this Article indicates, the Court's recent 
preemption cases raise troubling questions about the consistency of the Court's recent federalism 
jurisprudence. The Court's opportunity to plow further Eleventh Amendment ground disappeared 
when it disposed of the Vermont Agency case on statutory grounds, but a disclaimer at the end of 
that opinion158 makes it clear that the Court has still more questions involving the scope of state 
immunity from suit to resolve. Finally, the Court held in Kimel that § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not vest Congress with the power to subject the states to suit for alleged 
violations of the ADEA. The Court will soon address a similar question under the ADA, and may 
reach the same decision as it reached in Kimel with respect to the ADEA. 
What lessons do these diverse federalism cases provide for those seeking to ascertain how, if at all, 
the "new" federalism will affect efforts to adopt, implement, and enforce federal environmental 
protection laws? Part II seeks to address that question. 
II. The New Federalism and Federal Environmental Law 
The Court has filled its plate during the past two terms with cases bearing upon the allocation of 
decisionmaking authority between the federal government and the states. The discussion in the 
previous section indicates that the Court continues to find federalism to be an area worthy of 
further exploration. In the federalism Article we wrote last year, we concluded that,although the 
Court's federalism decisions had the potential to make the implementation and enforcement of 
federal environmental laws "more complicated and difficult in some instances," they "do not 
ultimately appear to preclude Congress from regulating environmental matters in any significant 
measure."159 In particular, we surmised that the Court's 1999 Eleventh Amendment trilogy was not 
likely to pose significant obstacles to the enforcement of federal environmental laws against state 
governments alleged to have violated those laws. The purpose of this part is to explore whether 
subsequent decisions, both by the Court and the lower federal courts, provide a basis for altering 
those conclusions. In short, we continue to inquire here whether the "new" federalism is likely to 
have significant implications for federal environmental law. 
A. The Commerce Power—Lopez Has Teeth 
1. SWANCC 
In perhaps its most important federalism decision of the past term, the Court made clear that Lopez 
has teeth, at least for now. Thus, in Morrison,160 the Court struck down a federal statute that was 
supported by an extensive factual record documenting the effects of gender-motivated violence on 
interstate commerce. Morrison makes clear that a federal law that does not deal with economic 
activity cannot be justified—at least on a commerce power basis—simply by the existence of 
congressional findings proclaiming effects on interstate commerce. That proposition is important, 
because it means that the Court's decision in Lopez cannot be explained away as merely an 
example of defective or insufficient legislative process. 
To date, the Court has not explored whether the new teeth will have any bite in the environmental 
context. But SWANCC, discussed above,161 provides the Court with an opportunity to clarify the 
significance of Morrison in the implementation and enforcement of federal environmental laws. To 
the extent that such laws do not deal with classic economic activity, their proponents will shoulder 
a greater burden to justify those measures on a commerce power basis. On the other hand, many 
federal environmental laws would not necessarily appear to intrude into areas of traditional state 
sovereignty, such as domestic relations or enforcement of the general criminal laws. For the future 
of federal environmental regulation of problems that are not necessarily transboundary in nature, 
such as wetlands protection measures, SWANCC promises to be the case to watch from the 2000 
Term. 
In Lopez, the Court identified three categories of activities subject to the federal commerce power: 
the use of the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or 
persons or things in interstate commerce, and activities having a substantial relation to (or that 
substantially affect) interstate commerce.162 The court of appeals in SWANCC asserted that "the gun 
control law at issue in Lopez, like the migratory bird rule challenged here, could only have been 
sustained as an exercise of the third [30 ELR 11132] variety of regulatory power."163 It is not 
impossible to imagine characterizing the migratory bird rule as an attempt to regulate either a 
channel or an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Because a wetland that harbors migratory 
birds must constitute a "navigable water" to be within the scope of the CWA's jurisdiction, for 
example, the regulated wetlands could be deemed channels of interstate commerce.164 A body of 
water need not be navigable in fact, however, to qualify as a "navigable water" for purposes of the 
CWA.165 Similarly, a rule whose function is to protect migratory birds could be characterized as an 
effort to control (and facilitate) things in interstate commerce.166 Assuming the Court reaches the 
constitutional question, however, the case will most likely turn on whether the regulated activity 
will be regarded as one that substantially affects interstate commerce, as the court of appeals held. 
The Seventh Circuit did not have the benefit of the Morrison decision when it addressed that 
question. 
Morrison emphasized that in Lopez, "the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct was central 
to our decision."167 In Lopez, the Court concluded that the possession of a gun in a local school 
zone was not an economic activity.168 Likewise, in Morrison, the Court found that gender-
motivated crimes of violence such as rape "are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic 
activity."169 That characterization was significant because, although the Court disclaimed the need 
to "adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity" to decide 
Morrison, it nevertheless stated that, "thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld 
Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in 
nature."170 Despite the disclaimer, the Court ultimately held that Congress may not regulate "non-
economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate 
commerce."171 
The regulated conduct in SWANCC is arguably distinguishable from the conduct in both Lopez and 
Morrison for two reasons. First, there is a strong argument that the conduct was economic in 
nature. In Lopez, the conduct was "possession of a gun in a local school zone."172 In Morrison, it 
was the act of committing a gender-motivated crime of violence. The CWA, as interpreted by 
Corps and EPA regulations, prohibits the dredging or filling of wetlands without a permit. In 
SWANCC, the conduct was the filling of wetlands for the purpose of constructing a site for the 
disposal of the trash of 23 Illinois municipalities. The dredging and filling of wetlands is often 
undertaken for purposes of commercial development. In this case, the entity engaged in the 
construction was presumably getting paid, and the trash that would wind up being sent to the 
balefill undoubtedly would include trash generated by businesses as well as homeowners. As the 
Court has recognized, the flow of waste can amount to commerce.173 
Second, SWANCC, unlike Lopez and Morrison, did not involve criminal conduct. The CWA 
empowers the United States to pursue criminal sanctions against those who engage in dredging or 
filling of navigable waters without or in violation of a permit.174 SWANCC was not charged with a 
criminal violation of the statute, however. Rather, it sought review in a civil suit under the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act of the Corps' denial of its dredge and fill permit application.175 The 
migratory bird rule, as applied to SWANCC, therefore, does not invade the traditional province of 
the states to suppress violent crime or vindicate its victims.176 As the Court noted in Morrison, it 
was the criminal as well as the noneconomic nature of the regulated conduct that was "central" to 
the decisions in both that case and Lopez.177 It is of course true that land use regulation is an area of 
"traditional state regulation,"178 and at least one justice has taken the position that the Court has 
consistently rejected readings of the Commerce Clause that would authorize federal power that 
would permit Congress to exercise a police power.179 It is a little late in the day, however, for the 
Court to take the position that environmental regulation, which often involves the imposition of 
constraints on land use, amounts to an inappropriate intrusion into an inviolate realm of state 
sovereignty.180 
There is yet another arguably distinguishing feature of SWANCC. In neither Lopez nor Morrison 
was the Court able to discern a "jurisdictional element" which might limit the reach of the statutes 
in question to a "discrete set" of activities with an "explicit connection with or effect on interstate 
commerce."181 The presence of such an element supports the contention that the regulated conduct 
is sufficiently tied to interstate commerce to pass constitutional muster. The CWA arguably 
possesses a jurisdictional element. The statute bars the discharge of pollutants without the required 
permit.182 The statute defines the discharge of a pollutant as its addition to "navigable waters."183 
Navigable waters, in turn, are defined to mean "waters of the United States."184 The [30 ELR 
11133] legislative history demonstrates convincingly that Congress meant by this definition to vest 
in EPA and the Corps the power to regulate activities to the fullest extent authorized by the 
Commerce Clause.185 Even the Corps' regulations, which interpret waters of the United States to 
include intrastate waters and wetlands, reach only those whose "use, degradation or destruction . . . 
could affect interstate or foreign commerce,"186 and the migratory bird rule, as the Court of Appeals 
in SWANCC noted, extends the prohibition on dredging or filling to waters "otherwise unrelated to 
interstate commerce," which are or could be used as migratory bird habitat.187 Thus, it is only 
waters that are somehow related to interstate commerce that fall within the intended scope of the 
rule. 
If the Court were to hold that the migratory bird rule exceeds the scope of federal power under the 
Commerce Clause, Congress would not necessarily lack the constitutional authority to bar the 
dredging and filling of wetlands as a means of protecting migratory bird habitat. The treaty 
power188 might well supply an alternative jurisdictional basis for the migratory bird rule, based on 
implementation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) of 1918, which the Court has upheld as 
a valid exercise of the treaty power.189 
2. Lower Court Cases 
Although the Court has yet to address the manner in which the Lopez and Morrison framework for 
analyzing the scope of the federal commerce power is likely to play out in the environmental arena, 
several lower court decisions have addressed the question. Whether the Court's resolution of 
SWANCC confirms or deviates from the results in those cases of course remains to be seen. The 
lower federal courts decided two important cases in the past year in which they rejected attacks on 
environmental regulation as beyond the scope of the federal commerce power. Both cases were 
handed down after the Court's decision in Morrison, and both may shed light on the Court's 
upcoming disposition of SWANCC as well as on the fate of other federal environmental statutes 
that may be attacked as unwarranted exercises of the commerce power.190 
a. Red Wolves 
In the first case, the Fourth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a regulation issued by the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).191 The agency 
undertook a program of reintroducing red wolves into national wildlife refuges in North Carolina 
and Tennessee pursuant to a provision of the ESA allowing the FWS to designate as 
"experimental" reintroduced populations of endangered or threatened species.192 That designation 
allows the agency to exempt the reintroduced animals from some of the more stringent protective 
provisions of the ESA.193 In this case, the FWS relaxed the Act's prohibition on the taking of 
members of listed species194 by allowing a person, among other things, to take red wolves on 
private land, provided the taking is unintentional, or is in the defense of human life, livestock, or 
pets.195 Several landowners brought a declaratory judgment action to invalidate the regulation as 
beyond the scope of the federal commerce power. The district court upheld the regulation, 
concluding that the wolves are "things in interstate commerce" because they have moved across 
state lines and are followed by tourists, academics, and scientists, and because they generate 
substantial effects in interstate commerce.196 
The Fourth Circuit's decision, written by Chief Judge Wilkinson, is notable for its insistence that 
the federal judiciary exercise restraint in the disposition of constitutional challenges involving 
allegedly excessive exercises of federal power,197 as well as for the vigorous dissent penned by 
Judge Luttig. The majority characterized the applicable analytical framework emanating from 
Lopez and Morrison as "rational basis review with teeth."198 Judge Wilkinson added, however, that 
the courts "may not simply tear through the considered judgments of Congress. Judicial restraint is 
a long and honored tradition and this restraint applies to Commerce Clause adjudications."199 
Although the federal judiciary must enforce "the structural limits of Our Federalism," it must "also 
defer to the political judgments of Congress."200 
[30 ELR 11134] 
Having set the stage, the majority proceeded to apply the Lopez-Morrison framework. The FWS' 
regulation was not a regulation of the channels of interstate commerce, which include things like 
navigable rivers, lakes, and canals. It did not regulate the movement of wolves or wolf products in 
the channels of interstate commerce.201 Nor did the regulation involve the protection of things in 
interstate commerce. The FWS did transport wolves interstate to study and reintroduce them, but, 
contrary to the district court's conclusion, "this is not sufficient to make the red wolf a 'thing' in 
interstate commerce."202 
If the government sought to defend the validity of the regulation on the basis of the aggregate 
effects of the class of regulated activities on interstate commerce, it had to show that "the regulated 
activity was of an apparent commercial character."203 According to the Fourth Circuit majority, 
"economic activity must be understood in broad terms" because "a cramped view of commerce 
would cripple a foremost federal power and in so doing would eviscerate national authority."204 
Here, it was reasonable for the FWS to conclude that it was regulating economic activity. 
According to the court, the taking of red wolves "implicates a variety of commercial activities and 
is closely connected to several interstate markets."205 Further, the regulation was an integral part of 
the overall scheme to protect, preserve, and rehabilitate endangered species, "thereby conserving 
valuable wildlife resources important to the welfare of our country."206 A primary reason to take red 
wolves on private land is to protect commercial and economic assets; farmers and ranchers take 
wolves due to concern that they pose a risk to commercially valuable livestock and crops.207 
Moreover, the court discerned a direct relationship between red wolf takings and interstate 
commerce because the disappearance of red wolves would mean the obliteration of tourism and 
scientific research related to the wolves and the commercial trade in red wolf pelts. Through 
preservation, the impact of the endangered species on interstate commerce could not but 
increase.208 Thus, the regulation was directed at economic activity and the individual takings of 
wolves could be aggregated for purposes of Commerce Clause analysis.209 The court proceeded to 
detail precisely how and to what degree red wolves generated—or could generate—interstate 
tourism, scientific research, and a trade in wolf pelts. The last point is particularly salient in 
assessing the possible outcome in SWANCC. If "the possibility of a renewed trade in fur pelts"210 is 
a sufficient basis for concluding that the regulated activity has sufficient interstate impact to justify 
federal regulation, then perhaps a finding that migratory birds could use a particular isolated 
wetland as habitat is enough to justify the Corps' migratory bird rule as well. 
Finally, in Gibbs v. Babbitt,211 the court noted that the taking of red wolves is connected to 
interstate markets for agricultural products and livestock; by restricting the taking of wolves, the 
regulation was alleged to impede economic development and commercial activities such as 
ranching and farming. That effect on commerce qualifies as a legitimate subject for regulation. The 
regulation targeted takings that are economically motivated in that farmers takes wolves to protect 
valuable livestock and crops. According to Judge Wilkinson, "it is for Congress, not the courts, to 
balance economic effects" by deciding whether the negative effects on commerce resulting from 
red wolf predation are outweighed by the benefits to commerce flowing from wolf restoration. "To 
say that courts are ill-suited for this act of empirical and political judgment is an 
understatement."212 Likewise, the migratory bird rule is alleged to impede real estate development 
and the regulation targets activities that are economically motivated. Indeed, if the government can 
demonstrate a trade in migratory birds or bird parts, or even the possibility of such trade, its 
argument for sustaining the rule would be still stronger. 
The Gibbs court provided additional ammunition of several types for proponents of the migratory 
bird rule. First, the court posited that Congress has ample authority "to regulate the coexistence of 
commercial activity and endangered wildlife in our nation and to manage the interdependence of 
endangered animals and plants in large ecosystems."213 It was permissible for Congress to "find that 
conservation of endangered species and economic growth are mutually reinforcing. It is simply not 
beyond the power of Congress to conclude that a healthy environment actually boosts industry by 
allowing commercial development of our natural resources."214 There is no apparent reason to 
confine this analysis to endangered species, as opposed to other kinds of plant and animal life, such 
as nonendangered migratory birds. Indeed, the last part of the quoted excerpt provides a strong 
defense of all kinds of federal environmental regulation, from protection of isolated wetlands that 
harbor migratory birds to protection of scarce and valuable resources such as clean air and water 
and uncontaminated land. The speculation inherent in assessing or predicting the extent to which 
environmental protection may promote economic development ought not to weaken this argument. 
As the Fourth Circuit indicated, "Congress is entitled to make the judgment that conservation is 
potentially valuable, even if that value cannot be presently ascertained."215 
Second, quoting Lopez, the Gibbs court sustained the regulation as an "essential part of a larger 
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the 
intrastate activity were regulated."216 The [30 ELR 11135] court also quoted from the Supreme 
Court's 1981 decision in Hodel v. Indiana,217 where the Court concluded that a complex regulatory 
program 
can survive a Commerce Clause challenge without a showing that every single facet of the program 
is independently and directly related to a valid congressional goal. It is enough that the challenged 
provisions are an integral part of the regulatory program and that the regulatory scheme when 
considered as a whole satisfies this test.218 
The government, then, presumably need not show that each and every isolated wetland is directly 
related to interstate commerce, as long as wetlands regulation is part of an integrated scheme for 
the protection of our nation's water resources and the ecosystems of which they are a part.219 
Third, the landowners in Gibbs claimed that the FWS regulation improperly infringed on 
traditional state powers over wildlife. The court responded that state control over wildlife "is 
circumscribed by federal regulatory power."220 In addition, the challengers protested that the 
regulation invaded traditional state prerogatives to regulate local land use, a contention that is 
certain to be at the core of the challenge to the migratory bird rule in SWANCC. The court's 
response was straightforward: "It is well established . . . that Congress can regulate even private 
land use for environmental and wildlife conservation."221 Accordingly, endangered wildlife 
regulation has not been an exclusive or even primary state function.222 Neither has protection of 
migratory birds, which has been a matter of federal concern since at least 1918, or prevention of 
water pollution, which dates back as far as 1899, the date of adoption of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act, or at least to 1948, when the first Federal Water Pollution Control Act was enacted.223 "The 
conservation of scarce natural resources," in short, "is an appropriate and well-recognized area of 
federal regulation."224 
Fourth, the Gibbs majority, citing Congress' ability to take cognizanceof and seek to halt the 
notorious "race to the bottom" with the aim of preventing interstate competition the effect of which 
is environmentally damaging, reasoned that the ESA was spurred in part by a desire to put in place 
uniform federal standards for the protection of endangered wildlife. The court refused to strike 
down the regulation in part because it might subject interstate companies "to a welter of conflicting 
obligations . . . . Courts cannot simply ignore or negate congressional efforts to devise [an] 
effective solution to a significant national problem."225 Efforts to prevent the "race to the bottom" 
lie, of course, not only behind the CWA, which spawned the migratory bird rule, but behind 
virtually every piece of federal environmental protection legislation,226 whether or not one is 
convinced of the legitimacy of the phenomenon (although the effort is often reflected in minimum 
rather than uniform federal standards).227 
In dissent, Judge Luttig took issue with the proposition that the FWS' regulation was directed at 
economic activity, and therefore protested application of the aggregation principle. Even if the 
regulation applied to economic activity, he charged, that activity lacked the requisite substantial 
effects on interstate commerce.228 Neither the statute nor the regulation contained an express 
interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement to ensure its constitutional validity.229 The 
regulation was directed at "an activity that implicates but a handful of animals, if even that, in one 
small region of one state."230 In effect, the majority opinion sought to confine both Lopez and 
Morrison to aberrational status.231 
b. Architectural Coatings 
The second post-Morrison environmental case was a challenge to EPA regulations issued under the 
CAA232 that limited the content of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in architectural coatings to 
facilitate achievement of the NAAQS for ozone.233 An association of manufacturers and 
distributors of these coatings asserted that the regulation exceeded the scope of the commerce 
power on the ground that there is an insufficient nexus between coatings manufacture and the 
interstate phenomenon of ozone formation.234 The D.C. Circuit distinguished Lopez and Morrison 
on four grounds. First, both those cases dealt with the control of noneconomic activity. The CAA's 
provision authorized regulation only of coatings sold or distributed in interstate commerce.235 
Second, the statutes struck down in the two Supreme Court cases lacked a jurisdictional element 
that limited their reach to activities connected to interstate commerce. The CAA's provision 
covered only products sold or distributed in interstate commerce.236 Third, neither of the statutes—
the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the VAWA—nor their legislative histories included 
congressional [30 ELR 11136] findings regarding the effects of the regulated activity on interstate 
commerce. The legislative history of the CAA described the problem of interstate transport of 
ozone as well as its effects on the national economy.237 Fourth, the link between gun possession or 
gender-motivated violence and interstate commerce was attenuated, whereas the interstate 
character of ozone formation and transport was clear.238 
At least two of these distinctions pertain to the isolated wetlands case, too. As indicated above, the 
activities regulated in SWANCC are arguably economic in character and the dredge and fill permit 
provisions appear to contain at least an implicit jurisdictional element. Further, the D.C. Circuit 
noted that the Court in both Lopez and Morrison cited with approval the Hodel case, where the 
Court endorsed the proposition that "the power conferred by the Commerce Clause [is] broad 
enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or other 
environmental hazards, that may have effects in more than one State."239 If the government in 
SWANCC can demonstrate that the potential aggregate effects of the dredging or filling of isolated 
wetlands on interstate commerce are substantial, then the CAA case supports an affirmance of the 
Seventh Circuit's decision. Even if it cannot, and the migratory bird justification for the isolated 
wetlands permit program is invalidated, the D.C. Circuit's opinion should provide comfort to those 
who fear the impact of Morrison on federal environmental regulation. The court's closing 
statement, quoted from Hodel, makes it relatively clear that the core aspects of federal 
environmental regulatory programs, where interstate effects will be demonstrable, should not be 
threatened by this aspect of the "new" federalism. 
3. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
Whatever the limits turn out to be in the environmental context, the Commerce Clause provides an 
affirmative delegation of authority to Congress to regulate some activities with adverse 
environmental consequences. That delegation also imposes limits on the degree to which the states 
may regulate matters with interstate implications, however.240 A recently enacted New York statute 
raises interesting questions concerning the operation of the "dormant" Commerce Clause. The 1990 
amendments to the CAA created a new program to control the emission of pollutants that are 
precursors to the formation of acid deposition, primarily sulfur dioxide (SO2) and oxides of 
nitrogen. The statute caps the allowable emissions of SO2 from electric power plants designated in 
the statute by assigning to them "allowances" to emit specified tons of SO2 annually.
241 It also 
authorizes regulated units to purchase and sell allowances, provided a particular unit does not emit 
SO2 in amounts that exceed the allowances it holds, either through the initial statutory assignment 
or through subsequent purchase.242 
Acid deposition is acknowledged to be an interstate phenomenon. Utilities that emit SO2 in the 
Midwest can exacerbate acid deposition in the Adirondack Mountains in New York, for example. 
In May 2000, the New York legislature, finding that the CAA is inadequate to protect the state, its 
people, and its resources from irreparable acid deposition-related damage, authorized a state 
agency to assess an "air pollution mitigation offset" against utility corporations that engage in the 
sale of SO2 allowances for use in "acid precipitation source states."
243 In effect, the statute seeks to 
create disincentives for New York utilities to sell SO2 allowances to sources in any state in which 
power plants could generate emissions that, due to prevailing wind patterns, might increase acid 
deposition in New York. At some point, the courts could well have to decide whether the New 
York statute is sufficiently disruptive of interstate commerce that it runs afoul of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.244 
B. The Eleventh Amendment 
1. Lower Court Cases 
In last year's Article, we minimized the significance of the Court's 1999 Eleventh Amendment 
trilogy for the enforcement of environmental law against the states by exploring six alternatives to 
private enforcement of federal environmental legislation against the states. These include (1) the 
exercise of "good faith" by the states; (2) "voluntary" state consent to suit for statutory violations; 
(3) Congress' power to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its powers under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; (4) suits against municipal governments that do not enjoy constitutionally 
protected sovereign immunity; (5) suits for injunctive relief directed at individual state officers; 
and (6) suits by the United States to enforce state compliance with federal mandates.245 We not only 
explained how each of these alternatives may mitigate the unavailability of direct suits against the 
states by private individuals in either state or federal court, but provided examples of circumstances 
in which resorting to these alternatives had already succeeded. 
The lower courts in the past year have provided additional examples that confirm both the 
availability and utility of these options. Perhaps the most novel of the Eleventh Amendment issues 
to be resolved this year related to the second and fifth categories of alternative enforcement 
options, state consent, or waiver of sovereign immunity.246 The Central Interstate Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Commission (Commission) and several utilities sued Nebraska alleging [30 
ELR 11137] breach of its obligations under the Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Compact.247 The plaintiffs alleged that the state improperly impeded licensing of a disposal facility 
in violation of the state's contractual and fiduciary obligations to the Commission. The state 
claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit, but the Eighth Circuit held that by entering into 
the interstate compact, Nebraska had waived its immunity from suit in federal court by the 
Commission to enforce the state's contractual obligations. The compact was a congressionally 
sanctioned agreement authorizing (indeed requiring) the Commission to enforce it against member 
states in federal court.248 In the alternative, the court held that the district court had jurisdiction to 
enjoin state officers from violating the compact under Ex parte Young249 because the relief sought 
was wholly prospective and the Commission made a sufficient showing of an ongoing violation of 
federal law.250 
In the category of suits brought by the United States, the Ninth Circuit held that the Eleventh 
Amendment did not bar a third-party claim against Alaska for equitable apportionment of tort 
liability arising out of the state's alleged negligence in contributing to leakage of fuel from a 
storage tank.251 The state argued that the state comparative fault statute created no legal duty 
between a defendant/third-party plaintiff and a third-party defendant. As a result, a claim by the 
United States against a state for equitable apportionment was essentially a claim asserted on behalf 
of a private citizen plaintiff, who could not assert the claim directly due to the state's sovereign 
immunity. The United States, in other words, acted as a conduit for the plaintiff's claim against the 
state as a means of circumventing the Eleventh Amendment. 
The court responded that in substance the federal government's claim was neither a private action 
nor intended to benefit primarily a private party. Instead, the main purpose of the third-party claim 
was to benefit the United States by reducing any damages it otherwise would owe to the plaintiff. 
Moreover, even if the private plaintiff would benefit by having the United States bring in the state 
as a party, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the federal government from bringing a claim 
against a state.252 Finally, the court rejected the state's argument that Eleventh Amendment 
immunity applied because the federal court's allocation of fault to the state might be converted into 
a money judgment enforceable by the plaintiff. The court interpreted Alden as supporting the 
proposition that the United States may sue a state even when its claim ultimately can result in a 
payment from the state's treasury to a private party. The relief sought by the federal government 
was equitable in nature. The remedy merely shifted a portion of the liability from the United States 
to the third-party defendant state.253 
Still, in cases in which none of the options discussed above is available, litigants pursuing 
environmental and related claims against the states or state agencies in federal or state court for 
violations of federal law are likely to be thwarted by the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of 
state sovereign immunity, as interpreted in the Court's 1999 trilogy. In one case, for example, a 
federal district court in New York held that the state's environmental agency was immune from a 
suit alleging that the state was violating the MBTA by spreading vegetable oil on unhatched 
cormorant eggs.254 The plaintiff argued that because the MBTA was adopted pursuant to Congress' 
treaty power, the Supremacy Clause dictates the conclusion that the MBTA overrides state 
sovereign immunity.255 Quoting Alden, however, the court concluded that the Supremacy Clause 
does not "confer authority [on Congress] to abrogate the States' immunity from suit in federal 
court."256 
The Second Circuit recently held that the Eleventh Amendment barred a citizen suit under three 
federal pollution control laws against state officers for injunctive and monetary relief relating to 
hazardous substance contamination emanating from a state-run prison.257 It was clear that Congress 
did not unequivocally abrogate state sovereign immunity (indeed, it explicitly preserved it).258 The 
plaintiffs [30 ELR 11138] alleged that the suit could nevertheless proceed because the suits were 
in the nature of qui tam actions in which the United States was the real party in interest, but the 
court quoted the statutes, which authorized citizens to sue "on [their] own behalf." Thus, the United 
States was not the real party in interest.259 
The court also inquired whether Congress had abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity when it authorized suits for the recovery of response costs under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Following Seminole Tribe 
of Florida v. Florida,260 the court concluded that Congress could not have done so pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause.261 The plaintiffs argued that CERCLA was also adopted pursuant to the 
spending power.262 The court, however, construed Seminole Tribe as well as the 1999 Eleventh 
Amendment trilogy as precluding resort to any Article I power as a source of abrogation 
authority.263 The spending power, however, is sui generis. As the Supreme Court recognized in one 
of the 1999 trilogy of Eleventh Amendment cases, Congress can invoke state consent to a waiver 
of sovereign immunity or impose other conditions when it exercises that power because "Congress 
has no obligation to use its Spending Power to disburse funds to the States; such funds are gifts."264 
The plaintiffs also claimed that by creating a claim for recovery of response costs, CERCLA 
created a property right and was therefore enacted pursuant to Congress' authority under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. But the court found that the mere creation of a private claim for damages 
does not give rise to a property interest in the form of a legitimate claim of entitlement.265 Finally, 
the plaintiffs argued that the state's acceptance of federal funds under CERCLA amounted to 
consent to suit, but the court found no evidence that Congress intended to condition receipt of 
CERCLA monies on a waiver of the recipient state's sovereign immunity.266 
2. Standing 
The Court had the opportunity to clarify another Eleventh Amendment issue of potential 
significance for environmental law litigation in Vermont Agency.267 The issue was whether a private 
individual may bring a suit in federal court on behalf of the United States against a state or state 
agency under the FCA.268 An individual brought a qui tam action in federal district court against a 
Vermont environmental agency, alleging that it had submitted false claims to EPA in connection 
with federal grant programs administered by the agency. After the United States refused to 
intervene, the defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that a state is not a "person" subject to 
liability under the FCA and that a qui tam action in federal court against a state is barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. The Court introduced a preliminary question, however: whether the plaintiff 
had Article III standing. The Court ruled that the plaintiff had standing because the FCA, which 
provides a bounty to prevailing plaintiffs, could be regarded as effecting a partial assignment to 
such plaintiffs of the government's damage claims.269 On the basis of this "representational 
standing" analysis, therefore, the Court held that the plaintiff demonstrated sufficient injury to 
satisfy Article III's injury-in-fact requirement.270 The Court then held that a state is not a "person" 
subject to suit under the FCA,271 thereby precluding the need to address the Eleventh Amendment 
question. 
The Vermont Agency case is potentially significant for two reasons. First, the Court's holding on 
the standing issue eliminates a potentially troublesome barrier to standing for environmental 
groups that might have resulted from a ruling that Article III precludes private individuals from 
bringing qui tam actions. An environmental plaintiff seeking to demonstrate Article III standing 
must show, among other things, that the relief being sought is redressable by the court. Before the 
Court's decision in the Laidlaw case, discussed below, there was some question whether citizen suit 
plaintiffs seeking the imposition of civil penalties payable to the government could make such a 
showing. Some commentators suggested increased reliance on qui tam actions as a means of 
solving the potential redressability problem.272 Had the Court in Vermont Agency held that Article 
III principles bar the pursuit of qui tam actions, such a solution would not have been available. 
Second, the Court's resolution of the statutory issue in Vermont Agency raises a strong presumption 
that the word "person" in a statute such as the FCA does not include sovereign states, and requires 
a "clear statement" from Congress in the relevant statute indicating that "person" does include the 
states in a particular instance to overcome the presumption. As indicated below,273 however, 
Congress in most of the federal environmental statutes has already explicitly defined the "persons" 
subject to suit for statutory violations to include states and state agencies. As a result, this aspect of 
Vermont Agency should not meaningfully restrict the ability of citizen suit plaintiffs to seek redress 
in federal court for state noncompliance. The Eleventh Amendment question the Court did not 
reach in Vermont Agency, however, remains open and could be a significant issue in litigation 
against a state under a federal statute that defines "person" to include the states. 
[30 ELR 11139] 
The Court's generous standing ruling in Vermont Agency must be further qualified because of an 
additional constitutional question the Court chose not to address. In some of the Court's restrictive 
standing cases handed down during the 1990s, the Court raised the possibility that citizen suits to 
enforce the environmental laws could be regarded as an improper infringement on the president's 
responsibility under Article II of the Constitution to "take Care that the laws be faithfully 
executed."274 In Vermont Agency, the Court "expressed no view on the question whether qui tam 
suits violate" the "take Care" clause of Article II.275 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, 
dissenting in Vermont Agency, concluded that the commonplace use of qui tam actions during the 
19th century rebuts the notion that the framers regarded them as foreclosed by the president's 
Article II powers.276 The views of the other seven members of the Court on the issue are not as 
clear, however. Should a majority of the justices ever conclude that qui tam actions or citizen suits 
pose a threat to the executive branch's ability to oversee enforcement of federal statutes, the critical 
role that citizen suits have played in supplementing government enforcement could be in jeopardy. 
The Court provided environmentalists with a clearcut victory in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,277 where it held that a plaintiff suing under the CWA 
need not establish actual harm to the environment but, rather, only harm to the plaintiff's interests 
in using and enjoying natural resources. Professor Daniel Farber has described the opinion as 
"refashioning" the Article III injury-in-fact inquiry by broadening the focus to include "not merely 
changes in the welfare of the individual considered in isolation, but also changes in the relationship 
between the individual and a natural resource."278 Thus, for example, a plaintiff may establish 
standing by demonstrating reluctance to swim in a river because of feared pollution rather than 
having to prove that the river was in fact unsafe due to pollution. This is a major victory for 
environmental plaintiffs. 
In addition, the Court in Laidlaw rejected the contention that the CWA's citizen suit plaintiff lacked 
standing to seek civil penalties because the penalties are payable exclusively to the government and 
payment therefore redresses no harm to the plaintiffs. Civil penalties, the Court reasoned, have 
deterrent effects. Therefore, "for a plaintiff who is injured or faces the threat of future injury due to 
illegal conduct ongoing at the time of suit, a sanction that effectively abates that conduct and 
prevents its recurrence provides a form of redress. Civil penalties can fit that description."279 The 
environmental public interest community emitted a huge collective sigh of relief in response to that 
aspect of Laidlaw, for a contrary conclusion would again have seriously threatened the utility of 
citizen suits under a host of federal environmental statutes as a mechanism for obtaining anything 
other than prospective injunctive relief. 
C. Fourteenth Amendment Power 
1. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
In Kimel,280 the Court made clear that it meant what it began in City of Boerne v. Flores281: 
Congress cannot merely invoke § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it addresses some 
form of discrimination and rely on that provision to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from suit. Rather, the Court will carefully review federal statutes that provide for suits 
against the states in contexts involving classifications, such as age or perhaps disability, that do not 
receive a heightened level of constitutional scrutiny. 
In conducting its § 5 inquiry, the Court will require that Congress have carefully and extensively 
documented the factual basis for addressing perceived problems. Moreover, the Court appears 
quite willing to scrutinize whetherCongress has tailored such measures to the parameters of the 
documented problems and has enacted targeted remedies for addressing those problems. The Court 
appears disinclined to approve § 5 legislation that relies upon sweeping factual generalizations or 
that provides for sweeping remedies. In light of Kimel, the ADA's abrogation provision appears 
likely to fail the Court's § 5 standards this term.282 
Although important in the context of federal antidiscrimination statutes generally, the Court's 
developing § 5 jurisprudence seems less practically significant for the implementation and 
enforcement of the federal environmental laws. The point is not that sovereign states typically have 
not been the defendants in environmental cases, although that is by and large true. As our Article 
last year indicated, state agencies sometimes are named as defendants in such cases. Nor is the 
point that Vermont Agency makes it clear that the courts will apply a presumption that any federal 
statute making a "person" subject to suit does not include states as a matter of statutory 
interpretation. Most of the major federal environmental statutes explicitly define "person" to 
include states.283 
Rather, the point is that, to date, Congress has not relied on its § 5 authority to adopt environmental 
legislation, preferring instead to invoke other sources of authority including (primarily) the 
Commerce Clause, as well as the Property [30 ELR 11140] Clause284 and the treaty power.285 If the 
Court in cases such as SWANCC makes it clear that some activities with potential adverse 
environmental effects are not within the reach of the commerce power, Congress may seek at some 
point to rely more heavily on alternative sources of regulatory authority, including § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Reliance on § 5 is certainly a possibility, for example, as a means of 
combating "environmental racism." In such a context, the Court's § 5 jurisprudence could become 
important, although Congress' constitutional power to abrogate the states' immunity is probably at 
its zenith when Congress is addressing race discrimination problems. Generally, however, it would 
appear that the scope of Congress' power to abrogate the states' immunity under § 5 is not terribly 
significant in the context of federal environmental law. The scope of Congress' commerce power is 
far more important. 
2. The Privileges and Immunities Clause 
An aspect of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence that could develop into a significant constraint 
on state power is the Privileges and Immunities Clause.286 Largely considered a dead-letter since 
the Slaughter-House Cases,287 the Court potentially revived that provision in Saenz v. Roe.288 The 
Court's reliance on this long dormant provision was somewhat surprising because, as Justice 
Thomas opined in dissent, "legal scholars agree on little beyond the conclusion that the Clause 
does not mean what the Court said it meant in 1873."289 
In Saenz, the Court struck down, as a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, a 
California durational residency requirement for welfare recipients. The majority characterized the 
residency requirement as interfering with the "right to travel," which does not appear in the 
Constitution's text but which the Court has recognized in previous cases.290 It is unclear, however, 
whether the Court would be willing to extend the protections of the clause to other kinds of 
statutory entitlements or benefits that might in some sense deter travel or migration. Moreover, it is 
not clear whether the Court will invoke the clause in circumstances that do not allegedly involve 
the "right to travel." Justice Thomas, in dissent, argued that the clause should be limited by 
historical understandings of "fundamental rights," and should apply only to state discrimination 
against nonresidents with respect to such rights, which would not include statutory benefits and 
entitlements.291 
It is likely that litigants will try to push the privileges and immunities envelope further than that. 
Property rights advocates, for example, have indicated that they will invoke the clause in an 
attempt to invalidate state and local regulatory infringements on economic liberties, including 
common-law property rights.292 State and local restrictions on development whose goal is 
environmental protection seem an obvious target for those pursuing this strategy, in the same way 
that these restrictions have become targets of advocates for an expanded role for the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
D. The Obvious Disconnect?: Federal Preemption of State Law 
Although the states generally fared well this past term in federalism and enumerated powers cases 
such as Kimel and Morrison, they lost every preemption case the Court decided.293 One 
commentator has suggested that "there is an obvious disconnect between the court's recent pre-
emption cases—generally displacing state laws—and many of its recent commerce clause and 11th 
Amendment cases—generally protecting state laws and powers."294 
Whether that is in fact an accurate assessment may become an important question. Justice Thomas, 
for example, joined the dissent in one important case last term in which the majority found broad 
federal preemption and disavowed reliance upon any "presumption against preemption."295 If 
conservative justices become convinced that current pre-emption jurisprudence is inconsistent with 
federalism principles, then that jurisprudence may change in a way favorable to the states and less 
favorable to Congress. 
One commentator recently argued that "pre-emption law is on a collision course with the 
conservative justices' celebrated project to re-establish structural constitutional principles on 
federalism."296 Focusing on the Court's decision in Geier,297 he asserted that "federalism concerns 
become particularly pressing when pre-emption derives not directly from statutory language, but 
rather from an administrative agency's action under its delegated authority."298 [30 ELR 11141] He 
then opined that the "attorneys who will argue the next pre-emption dispute may be looking at a 
case where every vote is in play,"299 because the liberal justices (who generally oppose federalism 
or state power) often embrace it in preemption cases, while the conservative justices cannot be 
counted on to ignore preemption as an area that raises a threat to federalism principles.300 
Other commentators have responded that "there is no real tension between the Supreme Court's 
federalism decisions and its pre-emption cases because the latter, properly understood, are not 
'about federalism.'"301 Their primary argument is that the key constitutional provision in the 
preemption context, the Supremacy Clause, is only "a choice-of-law rule in favor of federal law"302 
when federal and state law conflict. Thus, in their view, the issue in pre-emption cases is 
essentially one of statutory interpretation, and there is no dispute about the relevant constitutional 
provision in such cases. They further argue that nothing in the constitutional text or structure 
supports application of even a "presumption against preemption" when the Court engages in that 
inquiry.303 Thus, according to them, it is consistent for conservative justices to vote to limit 
Congress' commerce power, for example, but to hold that federal law displaces state law when 
Congress has appropriately exercised that power. 
Who has the better of the argument here? Perhaps there is some merit to both positions. Even 
accepting the proposition that preemption has nothing to do with federalism principles and is a 
matter of statutory interpretation, it is at least problematic that the issue often arises in the context 
of interpreting the preemptive effect of an administrative regulation.304 Nor is it so obvious, in light 
of cases such as Alden,305 that the current Court would agree that nothing in the Constitution's 
structure supports reliance on a "presumption against preemption" when interpreting federal laws. 
On the other hand, nothing in the text of the Supremacy Clause suggests such a tilting of the scales 
in favor of the states, and indeed several of Congress' Article I powers are exclusive to the federal 
government. Thus, it is clear that the Constitution's text contemplates areas of federal exclusivity, 
which is what a finding of preemption essentially establishes in any particular case. 
There does seem, however, to be common ground that there is no constitutional text that requires 
interpretation in preemption cases. Thus, the critical issue may well be whether constitutional 
structure justifies or fails to justify a presumption either against or in favor of federal preemption 
when the issue arises. This is essentially a question of whether one side or the other bears a burden 
of proof (or in the words of the Geier majority, a "special burden") in either establishing or refuting 
a claim of federal preemption of state law. 
In the environmental cases, the Court has sometimes invoked a presumption against preemption,306 
but not always.307 The existence of a presumption can be extremely important, as it may often be 
determinative of the outcome, i.e., the party that bears the burden of proof is more likely to lose. 
Thus, the Court's reading of the savings clause in Geier appears critical to the outcome in that case. 
In spite of that clause, the Geier majority refused to conclude that the party claiming federal 
preemption bore any "special burden" in establishing that claim. Indeed, after Geier it is not clear 
what Congress would have to say in a savings clause to avoid the possibility of federal 
preemption.308 
Even if the Court purports to apply a presumption against preemption, however, that presumption 
is likely manipulable by the Court. For example, the result in field preemption cases like Locke,309 
may well depend on how the Court defines the relevant "field." In Locke, the Court essentially 
defined the field as "maritime matters," which favored a finding of federal preemption because of 
the long federal involvement in maritime law and matters generally. On the other hand, had the 
Court defined the field as "regulation of the transportation of dangerous water contaminants," then 
the history of federal involvement would have been less comprehensive and shorter in duration. 
Thus, the Court can effectively control the outcome of cases by manipulating the definition of the 
relevant field. 
Another justification for a broad reading of federal pre-emption is a bias in favor of less regulation 
and a free market economy. Federal preemption may well be preferred by companies that do 
business in numerous jurisdictions. If state law is precluded by virtue of federal authority, then, at a 
minimum, those companies will only have to comply with one set of regulations regarding any 
particular activity.310 For this reason, companies may well prefer federal regulation of 
environmental matters, if coupled with preemption of state law regulation. 
Environmentalists, however, probably should disfavor federal preemption of state law. Although 
they desire a broad reading of Congress' commerce power, in situations such as the one facing the 
Court in the SWANCC case, they should not necessarily also advocate for broad federal pre-
emption. From their perspective, it may well be more desirable to have multiple layers of 
regulation, or at least the possibility of such regulation, than a single, uniform federal rule. 
E. Additional Statutory Federalism Issues 
As the discussion above indicates, the allocation of power to control conduct with potentially 
damaging environmental [30 ELR 11142] impact between the federal government and the states is 
a matter not only of constitutional mandate, but also of statutory decree. Two other issues that 
cropped up in the decisions of the lower federal courts during the past year may affect that 
allocation in important ways and are the focus of this concluding section. The manner in which 
these issues impact the respective roles of the federal and state governments in the "new" 
federalism era is within Congress' control as the issues are statutory rather than constitutional in 
nature. 
1. Federal Sovereign Immunity 
The focus of the Article we prepared last year on the "new" federalism, and the subject of the 
sections of this Article that deal with Eleventh Amendment, is the degree to which the states are 
immune from efforts by private citizens to enforce federal environmental obligations against them. 
The states do not represent the only level of government that is subject to, and sometimes violates, 
applicable environmental mandates. The federal government is a notorious culprit, responsible for 
a significant percentage of violations of both federal and state environmental laws.311 A recurring 
question is whether the states can enforce their own environmental laws against agencies of the 
federal government alleged to have violated them. A recent Ninth Circuit case facilitates such 
efforts by preserving state judicial fora for the imposition of liability on federal agencies. 
The case involved a suit by a California pollution agency in state court against the United States in 
which California sought civil penalties for violations of a state air quality permit at McClellan Air 
Force base.312 The United States removed the dispute to federal district court, which held that the 
CAA does not waive the federal government's sovereign immunity from liability to civil penalties 
imposed by a state to punish past violations of state and local air quality laws. Although the state 
agency did not challenge the propriety of the removal on appeal, the Ninth Circuit sua sponte 
addressed the issue to determine whether the district court had jurisdiction over the case. 
The Ninth Circuit held that removal was improper. The CAA's citizen suit provision provides that 
"nothing in this section or any other law of the United States shall be construed to prohibit, 
exclude, or restrict" state or local authorities from "bringing any enforcement action or obtaining 
any judicial remedy or sanction in any State or local court" against the United States respecting 
control and abatement of air pollution."313 The court found that this provision directly conflicts with 
the right of the federal government to remove actions from state to federal court under the general 
federal removal statute.314 The CAA provision "protects the right of state and local governments to 
obtain remedies or sanctions against the federal government in nonfederal fora" under state and 
local air quality laws,315 and therefore implicitly bars removal of such enforcement actions. The 
court vacated with directions to remand to the state court for consideration of whether the CAA 
waives federal sovereign immunity to civil penalties for past violations of state or local air quality 
laws. 
2. "Reverse" Preemption to Enforce Environmental Laws 
The preemption questions addressed above316 relate to the degree to which Congress, by adopting 
environmental legislation, or agencies such as EPA, in the course of implementing that legislation, 
preclude environmental protection efforts by the states that either fall within a field occupied 
exclusively by the federal government or that conflict with federal statutory text or purposes. By 
and large, the federal environmental statutes invite the cooperation and active participation of the 
states, which can assist in promoting federal statutory objectives, rather than disabling such 
supplemental efforts. Is it possible, however, that by authorizing state action to implement federal 
environmental laws (or state laws adopted in pursuit of federal environmental objectives), 
Congress may impose limits on the degree to which EPA is capable of enforcing the federal laws? 
That was the issue in the 1999 Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner317 case, and the Eighth Circuit 
provided an affirmative answer to the question.318 
Harmon was prompted by an investigation by the Missouri Department of Natural Resources 
(MDNR) into the practice of discarding of volatile solvent residue behind a railroad control 
equipment manufacturing plant. The state agency decided that the practice did not pose a threat to 
health and the environment and created a plan requiring Harmon to clean up the disposal area. 
While Harmon was cooperating with the MDNR, EPA began an administrative enforcement action 
in which it sought more than $ 2 million in civil penalties. Harmon requested that the MDNR not 
impose civil penalties. While EPA's administrative enforcement action was pending, a Missouri 
state court judge approved a consent decree entered into by Harmon and the MDNR in which the 
MDNR released Harmon from any liability for civil penalties, based on the fact that Harmon self-
reported its violations. When a federal administrative law judge subsequently imposed a $ 500,000 
civil penalty on Harmon, Harmon filed a complaint challenging the validity of that penalty. The 
district court held that imposition of the penalty violated the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) and was barred by principles of res judicata. EPA appealed, and the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed. 
[30 ELR 11143] 
The court based its holding on two alternative grounds. First, it held, EPA's overfiling was 
inconsistent with the statute. RCRA authorizes states to apply to EPA for permission to administer 
the statute's hazardous waste program. If EPA approves, the state is authorized to "carry out [the] 
program in lieu of the Federal program" in that state.319 The court reasoned that the plain language 
of the statute reveals Congress' intent that an authorized state program supplant the federal 
hazardous waste program in all respects, including enforcement.320 In essence, EPA's decision to 
approve a state program divests EPA of the authority to enforce it. In short, "EPA may not . . . 
simply fill the perceived gaps it sees in a state's enforcement action by initiating a second 
enforcement action without allowing the state an opportunity to correct the deficiency and then 
withdrawing the state's authorization."321 Allowing EPA to overfile would violate "the principles of 
comity and federalism so clearly embedded in the text and history of RCRA."322 
Second, Missouri law gave res judicata effect to the consent decree, thereby barring EPA's civil 
penalty action. The question turned on whether the plaintiffs in the two enforcement actions were 
identical or nearly identical. The court concluded that they were. Once EPA approved Missouri's 
program, it operated in lieu of the federal program. Thus, the two parties stood in the same 
relationship to one another, and it did not matter what their subjective interests were.323 
The precedential value of Harmon as a component of the "new" federalism era is not yet clear. The 
degree to which other circuits will follow, extend, distinguish, or depart from the Eighth Circuit's 
approach has yet to be sorted out. Just a week before Harmon was decided, the Tenth Circuit 
assumed without deciding that EPA had the power to overfile under RCRA.324 A federal district 
court in Ohio has interpreted Sixth Circuit precedent to refute the notion that a mere grant by EPA 
of enforcement authority to a state agency curtails EPA's own enforcement options.325 
Even if other circuits follow the lead of the Eighth Circuit, it is not yet clear whether the bar on 
overfiling recognized in Harmon is unique to RCRA or extends to other federal pollution control 
laws. The court in Harmon placed its primary reliance in resolving the statutory interpretation issue 
on the portion of RCRA that provides that an EPA-approved state hazardous waste program 
operates "in lieu of" the federal program. Other statutes, such as the CWA, lack that precise 
language.326 Regulated entities have already begun the process of trying to stretch the parameters of 
Harmon's prohibition on overfiling both geographically and in terms of subject matter. The fate of 
Harmon therefore bears close watching. 
III. Conclusion 
For all of the rhetoric associated with and attention being given to the Court's recent federalism 
decisions, as a practical matter the Court is tinkering at the edges of Congress' Article I powers and 
battling rear-guard federalism actions. Although a case like SWANCC could make a notable dent in 
federal authority to regulate some environmental problems, Congress' power to enact virtually all 
of the existing federal environmental statutes likely will remain intact. Moreover, the 1999 Term 
saw the Court adopt an expansive view of standing that makes it easier for many environmental 
plaintiffs to get into court to seek enforcement of various federal statutes. Thus, our general 
conclusion remains that the ability of Congress to enact, and for plaintiffs to enforce, federal 
environmental laws is largely uncurtailed by the Court's recent federalism and congressional power 
decisions. 
An often overlooked, and perhaps underestimated, piece of the environmental protection puzzle, 
however, may be the efforts of the states to regulate such matters. Generally speaking, it would 
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